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THE BENCH: ARE YOUNGER FEMALE JUDGES
HARSHER WITH SERIOUS CRIMES?
MORRIS B. HOFFMAN,a FRANCIS X. SHEN,b VIJETH IYENGARc &
FRANK KRUEGERd*
Abstract
We analyzed sentencing data from sixteen years of criminal trials in the State of
Colorado, consisting of almost 3,000 individual sentences, and discovered an interaction
effect of harm, gender, and age not reported in any of the empirical or experimental
literature. Young female judges punished high harm crimes substantially more than their
male and older female colleagues. These results, if confirmed, could have significant
strategic and tactical implications for practicing lawyers. They may also inform policies
surrounding judicial selection, education, training, and retirement.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2019, the United States Senate confirmed the nomination of Judge Allison Jones
Rushing to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Among Rushing’s
many impressive credentials, including graduating from a top law school and clerking for
a Supreme Court Justice, one demographic fact stood out: She was only thirty-six years
old. She is the nation’s youngest federal judge,1 joining a group of other young, female
appointees such as Holly Teeter (age thirty-nine; District of Kansas), Rebecca Jennings
(age forty-one; Western District of Kentucky), Emily Marks (age forty-six; Middle
District of Alabama), and Jill Otake (age forty-five; District of Hawaii).
Both major political parties have sought to nominate and appoint younger candidates
to life-tenured federal judgeships, no doubt in part to maximize their lingering influence
on the federal judiciary when those political parties might no longer be in power.2
Despite this trend, almost no academic literature exists examining whether young judges
differ from their older peers on the bench. In particular, no one has looked at how age and
gender interact in the context of criminal sentencing. This is a significant oversight, as
criminal sentencing is a core function of the judiciary. In the words of federal judge Jack
Weinstein, criminal sentencing is “perhaps the most difficult task of a trial court judge.”3
Will trial judges in their thirties sentence the same thirty years later, when they will likely
still be on the bench?
In this Article, we begin to answer this question by presenting the first study to
examine longitudinally the interactive effects of judicial age, gender, and crime level in
determining sentences in actual criminal cases. After two years of work—including data
requests, ensuring data integrity, detailed coding, and extensive statistical analysis—we
report here results from a unique database of 2,995 individual state criminal sentences
imposed in Colorado, covering 183 different types of crimes and 285 different judges—
1

Debra C. Weiss, Newly Confirmed 4th Circuit Nominee Is Now the Country’s Youngest Federal Judge,
A.B.A. J. (Mar. 6, 2019), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/newly-confirmed-4th-circuit-nominee-isnow-the-countrys-youngest-federal-judge [https://perma.cc/2P3K-NB2M].
2

James Joyner, Packing the Courts with Young Judges, OUTSIDE BELTWAY (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://www.outsidethebeltway.com/packing-the-courts-with-young-judges/ [https://perma.cc/FTA4-VU4C]
(discussing the youth of recent Republican judicial nominees); see also Carl Hulse, Liberals Begin Lining Up
Young Judges for a Post-Trump Surge, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/08/us/politics/liberals-courts-trump.html [https://perma.cc/MLS7-GJEL]
(discussing liberal efforts to nominate judges).
3

See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Does Religion Have a Role in Criminal Sentencing?, 23 TOURO L. REV.
539 (2007).
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180 male and 105 female—over a sixteen-year time span (2001–2016).4 Because we
observed in the dataset the same judges sentencing similar crimes as they grow older, the
data allowed us a window into the complex interaction of age, gender, crime seriousness,
and sentencing patterns.
The results of our analysis are striking, as we uncovered a three-way interaction not
previously reported in the empirical or experimental literature: For high harm crimes,
younger female judges sentenced convicted defendants more harshly than their male and
older female colleagues. We controlled for the independent effect of judicial experience,
leading to the conclusion that age—and not just experience on the bench—is driving the
results. On average, young female judges sentenced offenders convicted of high harm
crimes to 24% more incarceration (4.9 years more) than did their male colleagues, and to
25% more incarceration (5.1 years more) than did their older female colleagues. This
finding has implications for sentencing theory, for practical lawyering, and perhaps even
for public policy.
On the theoretical side, although a growing number of studies have examined the
impact of a judge’s background on sentencing, these studies have typically not accounted
for factors that change over time, the most obvious of which is age. The research reported
here should pave the way for longitudinal studies examining how different judges’
sentencing patterns might change over time. Our results also serve as a reminder for
future empirical research of how important it is not just to control for different variables,
but also to pay attention to their interactions. In our data, age alone had no impact on
sentencing; neither did gender. Even when we considered age and gender together,
without distinguishing between the harm levels of the crimes, this two-way interaction
had no impact. Only when we considered age, gender, and harm levels together did we
see these three factors impact—and impact substantially—the sentences imposed by these
judges.
Our results could have practical implications as well. When the stakes are high—as
they are with the types of high harm crimes in which our interaction effect emerges—
both prosecutors and defense attorneys will look to every possible angle to move the
sentence toward their preferred outcome. The complexities of individual sentencing, and
the limitations of a single empirical study, caution against the conclusion that all older
female judges and all male judges will always be more lenient than young female judges
4

We chose Colorado for the simple reason that the judge-author had unique access to the electronic forms of
the case data. But Colorado is also in some ways a typical state when it comes to criminal sentencing in that it
is, like the vast majority of states, a so-called Model Penal Code state rather than a sentencing-guideline state.
See infra text accompanying notes 87–88.

40.1

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

131

with all serious offenders. But the study’s real-world data provides both prosecutors and
defense attorneys with a stark warning: The interaction of a judge’s age and gender,
together with the seriousness of a case, likely matters in determining the sentencing
outcome. These findings might even impact public policy in arenas including the
selection, education, training, and retirement of judges.
In Part I, we survey the existing literature on the impact of judge demographics on
criminal sentencing and on “punitiveness” and “third-party punishment” more generally.
In Part II, we introduce our new study and discuss its analysis of judicial background
variables on sentencing. In Part III, we present the results of our analysis and consider
limitations and cautions for interpreting those results. In Part IV, we discuss the
implications of these results for future research on judicial sentencing, for practical
lawyering, and for judicial selection, education, and retirement policies.
I. Gender, Age, and Sentencing: Conventional Wisdom and Empirical
Literature
There is a robust but largely disconnected body of work across multiple disciplines
examining the effect that individual background characteristics have on punishment
decisions. We briefly review this literature, focusing on “punitiveness” and “third-party
punishment,” and then review empirical studies examining actual criminal sentences by
real judges.
A. Punitiveness
Research on “punitiveness,” conducted mostly in sociology, psychology, and
criminology, typically asks experimental participants or survey respondents questions
about how they would react to certain hypothetical situations—not necessarily criminal
situations—and measures their “punitiveness” based on their responses. Investigators
then attempt to correlate the subjects’ measured punitiveness with various individual
characteristics, including race, ethnicity, gender, age, educational background, socioeconomic status, and even religious and political affiliations and beliefs.5
5

See, e.g., Karen K. Dion, Children’s Physical Attractiveness and Sex as a Determinate of Adult
Punitiveness, 10 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 772, 773 (1974); KAREN GELB, PREDICTORS OF PUNITIVENESS:
COMMUNITY VIEWS IN VICTORIA 9–10 (2011),
https://researchdirect.westernsydney.edu.au/islandora/object/uws%3A27169/datastream/PDF/view
[https://perma.cc/RZ35-67Y7]; Devon Johnson, Racial Prejudice, Perceived Injustice, and the Black-White
Gap in Punitive Attitudes, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 198, 200–01 (2008); Brian K. Payne et al., What Drives Punitive
Beliefs?: Demographic Characteristics and Justifications for Sentencing, 32 J. CRIM. JUST. 195, 199 (2004).
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Measures of criminally-relevant punitiveness typically focus on four areas: (1)
questions about criminals’ rights and the punishment of criminals; (2) questions about the
death penalty; (3) questions about support for spending on fighting crime and on the
criminal justice system; and (4) questions that relate to confidence and trust in the police
and the criminal justice system.6
Researchers have explored several individual background variables that affect
punitiveness measures. Demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, race, and
geographic region, may all influence punitive attitudes to different degrees.7 Some
studies show that men are, on the whole, more punitive than women.8 However, other
studies indicate that women are more punitive than men with regard to specific types of
crimes.9 Age and punitive attitudes appear to have a curvilinear relationship, with the
oldest and youngest people being the least punitive.10 Although members of all races may
be punitive, they may have different reasons for their punitiveness11 or be punitive in
6

Peter K. Enns, The Public’s Increasing Punitiveness and Its Influence on Mass Incarceration in the United
States, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 857, 860–61 (2014).
7

See MARC MORJÉ HOWARD, UNUSUALLY CRUEL: PRISONS, PUNISHMENT, AND THE REAL AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM 163 (2017) (opining that race, religion, politics, and business can explain increasing
American punitiveness); Payne et al., supra note 5, at 199–202 (finding that demographic predictors had
some impact but that none were particularly strong predictors of punitive attitudes and noting that
justifications for sentencing were strongly linked to punitive attitudes). See generally Lynne D. Roberts &
David Indermaur, Predicting Punitive Attitudes in Australia, 14 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 56 (2007)
(finding that demographic factors are weak to moderate predictors of punitive attitudes).
8

Brandon K. Applegate et al., Public Views Toward Crime and Correctional Policies: Is There a Gender
Gap?, 30 J. CRIM. JUST. 89, 95 (2002); John K. Cochran & Beth A. Sanders, The Gender Gap in Death
Penalty Support: An Exploratory Study, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 525, 530 (2009) (finding a robust gender difference
for support of the death penalty, with men showing more support than women).
9

Jane B. Sprott, Are Members of the Public Tough on Crime? The Dimensions of Public “Punitiveness”, 27
J. CRIM. JUST. 467, 468–72 (1999) (finding that women were more punitive in response to the belief that
crime was increasing and that women were less punitive than men in cases with teenage defendants). See
generally Peter H. Rossi et al., Just Punishments: Guideline Sentences and Normative Consensus, 13 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 267 (1997).
10

PETER H. ROSSI & RICHARD A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND PUBLIC VIEWS
COMPARED 180 (1997).
11

Devon Johnson, Crime Salience, Perceived Racial Bias, and Blacks’ Punitive Attitudes, 4 J. ETHNICITY
CRIM. JUST. 1, 11–14 (2007) (finding, based on data from the 2001 Race, Crime, and Public Opinion Study,
that fear of crime and individualistic attributions for criminal behavior significantly increase Blacks’ punitive
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different ways.12 Finally, while some scholarship suggests the idea of a “southern
vigilantism,”13 other research has found no significant direct effect of geography on
punitive attitudes.14
Political beliefs, religiosity, and economic perspectives may also play a role.
Research has consistently found that people who have conservative political views are
more likely to support punitive policies,15 though of course those policies themselves may
attitudes, but that perceived racial bias and vicarious exposure to incarceration decrease them); Devon
Johnson, Punitive Attitudes on Crime: Economic Insecurity, Racial Prejudice, or Both?, 34 SOC. FOCUS 33,
41–43 (2001) (finding that whites’ punitive attitudes are not associated with personal economic insecurity,
but that Jim Crow and laissez-faire racism are significantly correlated with higher punitiveness by white
people); Johnson, supra note 5, at 198, 203–04 (finding that racial prejudice and perceived racial bias explain
the gap); see also Ted Chiricos et al., Racial Typification of Crime and Support for Punitive Measures, 42
CRIMINOLOGY 359, 374–76 (2004) (finding that racial typification of crime is a significant, independent
predictor of punitiveness, particularly in white people who are less prejudiced, not southern, not conservative,
and have low crime salience); Kelly Welch et al., The Typification of Hispanics as Criminals and Support for
Punitive Crime Control Policies, 40 SOC. SCI. RES. 822, 830–32 (2011) (finding the same effects as Chiricos
et al., supra, with respect to typification of Hispanics as criminals as opposed to African Americans). See
generally Steven F. Cohn et al., Punitive Attitudes Toward Criminals: Racial Consensus or Racial Conflict?,
38 SOC. PROBS. 287 (1991) (finding that punitive attitudes of white people stemmed partly from racial
prejudice while punitive attitudes of Black people were associated with fear of crime); Mark Peffley et al.,
Racial Attributions in the Justice System and Support for Punitive Crime Policies, 45 AM. POL. RES. 1032,
1042 (2017) (surveying attitudes about policing held by Blacks, Latinos, and whites).
12

See, e.g., Payne et al., supra note 5 (finding interaction effect between punitive attitudes and justifications
for punishment varied across race and gender).
13

James D. Unnever et al., Turning the Other Cheek: Reassessing the Impact of Religion on Punitive
Ideology, 22 JUST. Q. 304, 326–29 (2005).
14

Alex R. Piquero & Laurence Steinberg, Public Preferences for Rehabilitation Versus Incarceration of
Juvenile Offenders, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 1–3 (2010) (finding that the public in four states in different
geographic regions was overall willing to pay more in taxes for rehabilitation than incarceration). See
generally Marian J. Borg, The Southern Subculture of Punitiveness? Regional Variation in Support for
Capital Punishment, 34 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 25 (1997) (finding little variation between
southerners and non-southerners in their support of the death penalty but noting that geographic region
“conditions the effects of racial prejudice, religious fundamentalism, and political conservatism” on support
for the death penalty).
15

Unnever et al., supra note 13, at 320–21 (citing Melissa Moon et al., Putting Kids to Death: Specifying
Public Support for Juvenile Capital Punishment, 17 JUST. Q. 663 (2000). But see Barbara A. Gault & John
Sabini, The Roles of Empathy, Anger, and Gender in Predicting Attitudes Toward Punitive, Reparative, and
Preventative Public Policies, 14 COGNITION & EMOTION 495, 516 (2000) (stating that Democrats and
Republicans showed almost no differences in their preferences for punitiveness). See generally Brenda L.
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be definitionally part of being conservative. Research on religious beliefs and
punitiveness has produced less consistent findings, with some studies finding that
conservative theological beliefs are correlated with increased punitiveness and other
research showing no correlation.16 Studies have also found that support for welfare and
support for punitive sanctions are inversely related,17 while a belief in economic
individualism is positively related to punitiveness.18
Not surprisingly, punitive attitudes may vary depending on the type of offender or
offense, with people tending to be harsher toward crimes they perceive to be more
violent19 and offenders they believe to be less capable of rehabilitation. A person’s belief
that others can change results in less punitiveness,20 but evidence that people continue to
Vogel & Ronald E. Vogel, The Age of Death: Appraising Public Opinion of Juvenile Capital Punishment, 31
J. CRIM. JUST. 169 (2003)).
16

MARC MORJÉ HOWARD, supra note 7, at 163 (stating that in non-death penalty situations, evangelicals are
more punitive than people who are religious but non-evangelical because they tend to blame the individual
perpetrator); Unnever et al., supra note 13, at 329 (finding that people who have a “rigid and moralistic”
approach to religion and view God as a powerful distributor of justice are more likely to have punitive
attitudes about offenders, but that people who have a loving image of God are more compassionate toward
others and less punitive); Kevin H. Wozniak & Andrew R. Lewis, Reexamining the Effect of Christian
Denominational Affiliation on Death Penalty Support, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 1082, 1085–86 (2010) (finding,
based on data from the General Social Survey, that affiliation with any Christian denomination increases the
likelihood that an individual will support the death penalty compared to nonreligious individuals).
17

Katherine Beckett & Bruce Western, Governing Social Marginality: Welfare, Incarceration, and the
Transformation of State Policy, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 43, 50–51 (2001); Michael J. Hogan et al., Economic
Insecurity, Blame, and Punitive Attitudes, 22 JUST. Q. 392, 402 (2005); Ashley T. Rubin, Punitive Penal
Preferences and Support for Welfare: Applying the “Governance of Social Marginality” Thesis to the
Individual Level, 13 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 198, 207 (2011).
18

Ryan Kornhauser, Economic Individualism and Punitive Attitudes: A Cross-National Analysis, 17
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 27, 34 (2015). This relationship may well be mediated by beliefs in free will. See infra
text accompanying notes 37–38.
19

Kristy Holtfreter et al., Public Perceptions of White-Collar Crime and Punishment, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 50, 53
(2008) (finding that the majority of respondents supported punishing violent criminals more severely than
white-collar criminals but that over one-third of respondents expressed the opposite opinion); see also Russil
Durrant et al., Understanding Punishment Responses to Drug Offenders: The Role of Social Threat,
Individual Harm, Moral Wrongfulness, and Emotional Warmth, 38 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 147, 163–64
(2011) (finding perceptions of moral wrongfulness to be the best predictor of punishment responses across
offense types).
20

See Shadd Maruna & Anna King, Public Opinion and Community Penalties, in ALTERNATIVES TO PRISON:
OPTIONS FOR AN INSECURE SOCIETY 83–112 (Anthony Bottoms et al. eds., 2004).
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commit crimes increases punitiveness.21 Relatedly, studies have generally found that
individuals have less punitive attitudes when juvenile offenders are involved compared to
adults.22 People are also generally more punitive with sex offenders compared to other
kinds of offenders.23
Although informative to a certain extent, the punitiveness literature has important
limitations when it comes to shedding light on actual judicial sentencing biases. For
instance, “punitiveness” is often defined in a rather narrow, explicitly pejorative way. A
widely-used instrument to measure it is unabashedly called “the vengeance scale,” and its
authors describe it as measuring the kind of “revenge . . . implicated in a broad range of
criminal and anti-social acts.”24 By asking subjects to put themselves in the shoes of
crime victims, rather than in the shoes of judges or juries, this instrument is probably
measuring “second-party punishment” rather than “third-party punishment,” to use the
terms we will introduce in Part I.B. This is hardly a reliable gauge, at least directly, of the
retributive components in a criminal sentence.
B. Third-Party Punishment
Evolutionary theorists coined the term “third-party punishment” to describe the
situation where one person punishes another for a norm violation even though the

21

VALERIE J. CALLANAN, FEEDING THE FEAR OF CRIME: CRIME-RELATED MEDIA AND SUPPORT FOR THREE
STRIKES 12 (2005).
22

See Piquero & Steinberg, supra note 14, at 1–3. Contra Justin T. Pickett & Ted Chiricos, Controlling
Other People’s Children: Racialized Views of Delinquency and Whites’ Punitive Attitudes Toward Juvenile
Offenders, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 673, 690–92 (2012) (finding that white people who hold racial typifications
about delinquency and victimization as well as racial resentment favor more punitive policies for juveniles);
Christi Metcalfe et al., Using Path Analysis to Explain Racialized Support for Punitive Delinquency Policies,
31 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 699, 709–11 (2015) (reaching the same conclusion).
23

See generally Darren L. Rogers & Christopher J. Ferguson, Punishment and Rehabilitation Attitudes
Toward Sex Offenders Versus Nonsexual Offenders, 20 J. AGGRESSION MALTREATMENT & TRAUMA 395
(2011).
24

See generally Noreen Stuckless & Richard Goranson, The Vengeance Scale: Development of a Measure of
Attitudes Toward Revenge, 7 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 25 (1991) (contextualizing revenge to be
measured by the Vengeance Scale); Gizem Uzun, Vengeance Scale: Reliability and Validity Study with
Gender Differences, 52 QUALITY & QUANTITY 1455 (2018) (describing “punitiveness” as a “rudimental,
destructive and illogical personality, accompanied by some personality disorders”).

136

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

40.1

punisher was not the victim of the violation.25 Third-party punishment is to be
distinguished from “second-party punishment”—or what we might also call retaliation or
revenge—where the person or animal doing the punishing was the victim of the
wrongdoer’s transgression.26
Second-party punishment is a form of self-defense and is widespread throughout the
animal kingdom.27 By contrast, third-party punishment, though a human universal,28
seems unique to humans.29 Many evolutionary theorists believe that third-party

25

See generally Robert Boyd et al., The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment, 100 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.
3531 (2003); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE 137 (2002); Ernst
Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 25 EVOLUTION HUM. BEHAV. 63 (2004);
Bettina Rockenbach & Manfred Milinski, The Efficient Interaction of Indirect Reciprocity and Costly
Punishment, 444 NATURE 718 (2006) (discussing that biologists and economists often call third-party
punishment “altruistic” or “costly” punishment).
26

MORRIS B. HOFFMAN, THE PUNISHER’S BRAIN: THE EVOLUTION OF JUDGE AND JURY 121–49 (2014). “Firstparty punishment,” to complete our list of types of evolved punishments, is a way to describe our evolved
moral intuitions. Id. at 92–120. One of the reasons most of us do not violate certain core norms, perhaps the
biggest reason, is not that we fear retaliation from the victim or punishment by a third party but because we
know it is wrong. We “punish” ourselves ahead of time with conscience or afterwards with guilt. Seneca put
it aptly: “The first and greatest punishment of the sinner is the conscience of sin.” 1 THE EPISTLES OF LUCIUS
ANNAEUS SENECA 146 (T. Morrell trans., Palala Press 2015) (1786).
27

Morris B. Hoffman & Frank Krueger, The Neuroscience of Blame and Punishment, in SELF, CULTURE AND
CONSCIOUSNESS: INTERDISCIPLINARY CONVERGENCES ON KNOWING AND BEING 207, 208 (Sangeetha Menon et
al. eds., 2017) (discussing that second-party punishment is likely widespread because it may be rooted in the
immunological response). See generally Richard Gordon, A Retaliatory Role for Algal Projectiles, 126 J.
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 419 (1987) (describing how algae engages in second-party retaliative punishment by
firing projectiles against would-be microscopic predators).
28

DONALD BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 138 (1991). See generally Frank W. Marlowe et al., More
“Altruistic” Punishment in Larger Societies, 275 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 587 (2008).
29

Katrin Reidl et al., No Third-Party Punishment in Chimpanzees, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 14824,
14824–26 (2012) (finding that chimpanzees, one of humans’ closest living relatives, may retaliate against
theft but do not engage in third-party punishment). But there are also tantalizing signs that non-human
primates, and even some species of fish, have certain kinds of precursors to third-party punishment. See
generally, e.g., Toshisada Nishida, A Within-Group Gang Attack on a Young Adult Male Chimpanzee:
Ostracism of an Ill-Mannered Member?, 36 PRIMATES 207 (1995); Nichola Raihani et al., Punishers Benefit
from Third-Party Punishment in Fish, 327 SCI. 171 (2010); Claudia Rudolf von Rohr et al., Impartial ThirdParty Interventions in Captive Chimpanzees: A Reflection of Community Concern, 7 PLOS ONE 1 (2012).
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punishment is an evolved trait that enabled our ancestors, despite their genetic
heterogeneity, to live in intensely social small groups by deterring norm violators.30
In the course of performing experiments related to third-party punishment,
researchers have developed sophisticated tools to unpack the factors that drive criminal
punishment. These tools include criminal hypotheticals that vary the amount of harm and
the mental state of the hypothetical criminal. Subjects read the hypotheticals and are then
asked how much they would punish the hypothetical offender, typically on a scale of zero
to nine—zero being defined as no punishment and nine being defined as the most serious
punishment the subject can imagine. Here is one example of such a hypothetical, drawn
from earlier work by several of the co-authors of the present article, presenting a situation
involving somewhat serious harm and the mental state of “knowingly”:
John is doing carpentry work on his house, which abuts a public
mountain bike trail. While carrying wood planks, John drops some onto
the trail and doesn’t pick them up because he wants to start the carpentry,
even though he is aware that there is a substantial risk that bikers will hit
the planks and be injured. Two bikers passing by at that moment hit the
planks, crash as a result, and are seriously injured.31
This research has yielded some important results for the law, including that the
amount subjects blame hypothetical purposeful crimes that differ in harm is remarkably
uniform across subject demographics.32 This research has also demonstrated that while
ordinary people are good at distinguishing purposeful, knowing, and negligent crimes,
they are terrible at distinguishing knowing crimes from reckless ones.33

30

See, e.g., Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity: Cooperation in
Heterogeneous Populations, 65 THEORETICAL POPULATION BIOLOGY 17, 18–23 (2004) (modeling group
effects of punishment and reciprocity). See generally Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 25; Jillian J. Jordan &
David G. Rand, Third-Party Punishment as a Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games,
421 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 189 (2017); Morris B. Hoffman & Timothy H. Goldsmith, The Biological
Roots of Punishment, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 627 (2004).
31

Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1328 (2011).

32

See generally, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal
Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007); Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and
Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007).
33

Shen et al., supra note 31, at 1337–38.
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Only a handful of these third-party punishment experiments have examined the
effects of the subject punisher’s demographics, and those have all been limited to race. In
one of the most important studies using actual judges as experimental subjects,
researchers in 2009 found that when the race of the defendant was not made explicit, but
rather subliminally primed, neither Black nor white judges showed any sentencing biases
for or against Black defendants as correlated to the judges’ measured implicit biases. But
when the defendant’s race was explicitly stated, Black judges but not white judges
showed sentencing biases in favor of Black defendants that correlated to the Black
judges’ measured implicit biases.34 The authors’ speculation: At least when the race of
the defendant was made explicit, white judges compensated for their implicit bias, but
Black judges did not.35 There is no comparable experimental literature, using either
judges or non-judges, examining the effects of the punisher’s gender or age.
Akin to the literature correlating various political beliefs to punitiveness,36 third-party
punishment studies have shown that the amount of hypothetical punishment imposed by
non-judge subjects is greater when those subjects have a stronger measured belief in free
will, although that correlation appeared only for low-harm crimes.37 When the
hypothetical crimes were very serious, subjects with weak beliefs in free will punished
just as harshly as those with strong beliefs in free will.38 These results were among the
first to suggest that the seriousness of the crimes at issue may be mediating other twoway correlations in a three-way interaction, a phenomenon we saw in a different form
here.
Of course, both the punitiveness and third-party punishment studies suffer from the
same central ecological challenge: It is one thing to test how ordinary people—or even
judges—might rank hypothetical crimes or impose hypothetical punishments on

34

Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 72
(2009); see also Francis X. Shen, Minority Mens Rea: Racial Bias and Criminal Mental States, 68 HASTINGS
L.J. 1007 (2017) (discussing a between-subjects experiment examining the effect of first names on third-party
punishment, in which non-judge subjects showed no punishment differences between vignettes featuring
protagonists named John, Jamal, Emily, and Lakisha).
35

Rachlinski et al., supra note 34, at 1224.

36

See supra text accompanying notes 14–23.

37

See generally Frank Krueger et al., An fMRI Investigation of the Effects of Belief in Free Will on ThirdParty Punishment, 9 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1143 (2014).
38

Id.
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hypothetical offenders, but quite another to impose real sentences on real offenders in
actual criminal cases.
C. Studying Actual Criminal Sentences
Studying actual criminal sentences has proved to be more challenging than doing
punitiveness surveys or third-party punishment experiments, largely because of the
difficulty of gathering the sentencing data itself, not to mention data on judge
characteristics. Researchers typically face a trade-off between ecological validity on the
one hand and experimental control on the other. An important value of doing laboratory
experiments on punishment is that the researcher can control all relevant aspects of the
fictional vignette. A researcher analyzing real case decisions must account for the fact
that no two cases are exactly the same.39 But the sword cuts both ways, as studies
utilizing experimental paradigms outside the court system sacrifice much in terms of
ecological validity. As Gregory Sisk and colleagues have observed, “[e]ither it is not the
same or it is not real—lack of comparability among cases or the absence of authenticity
are the Scylla and Charybdis of empirical study of judicial decisionmaking.”40 Research
to date on the effect of individual demographics on judicial sentencing has had to find
ways to address this challenge. We review this literature by examining, in order, research
on gender, race, age, judicial ideology, and the interaction of these and other background
variables.41
1. Gender
Research has revealed a number of differences between female and male judges,
though the magnitude of those differences appears small.42 For example, one study
39

Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial
Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1380 (1998).
40

Id.

41

We do not include in this Section any discussion of the vast literature examining the effects of the
defendant’s age, gender, and race on sentencing outcomes. See, e.g., Barbara A. Koons-Witt et al., Gender
and Sentencing Outcomes in South Carolina: Examining the Interactions with Race, Age, and Offense Type,
25 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y. REV. 299 (2014) (finding females sentenced less harshly than similarly-situated males,
but this difference subject to significant interaction by severity of offense; whites sentenced less harshly than
Blacks, but Black females sentenced just as harshly as white males; no interactions with age).
42

See generally Darrell Steffensmeier & Chris Herbert, Women and Men Policymakers: Does the Judge’s
Gender Affect Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?, 77 SOC. FORCES 1163 (1998); Herbert M. Kritzer &
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looking at sentencing outcomes in Pennsylvania state courts from 1991 to 1993 found
that female judges were somewhat (11%) more likely to incarcerate offenders than their
male counterparts, and that their sentences were on average 1.5 months longer.43 On the
civil side, the gender of the judge appears to matter in some, but not all, contexts, notably
in cases that deal with sexual harassment or gender-based discrimination.44 Likewise,
some studies have shown that the presence of a woman on appellate panels affects the
decision in cases that involve gender-related issues.45
2. Race
A growing literature on the effects of judicial race on decision-making, particularly
comparing Black and white judges, has reported a variety of findings but no overarching

Thomas Uhlman, Sisterhood in the Courtroom: Sex of Judge and Defendant in Criminal Case Disposition, 14
SOC. SCI. J. 77 (1977) (finding no differences in incarceration rates; lengths not studied); John Gruhl et al.,
Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges, 25 AM. J. POL. SCI. 308 (1981) (finding that female
judges slightly more likely to incarcerate; no difference in lengths); MARTHA A. MYERS & SUSETTE M.
TALARICO, THE SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF CRIMINAL SENTENCING (1987) (finding no differences in rates or
lengths).
43

Steffensmeier & Herbert, supra note 42, at 1174–76.

44

See Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389,
400–02 (2010) (finding that judicial gender only affects decisions in sex discrimination cases, with female
judges more likely to decide in favor of the party alleging discrimination); Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro,
Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision
Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299, 319–20 (2004) (finding that female judges are more likely to vote in
favor of the plaintiff in employment discrimination cases and that the presence of at least one woman on a
three-judge panel increases the likelihood that the panel will vote for the plaintiff); Jennifer L. Peresie,
Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE
L.J. 1759, 1761, 1776 (2005) (finding that female judges are more likely to vote in favor of plaintiffs in Title
VII sex discrimination and sex harassment cases); Donald R. Songer et al., A Reappraisal of Diversification
in the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425, 432–34 (1994) (finding that
in an analysis of votes of appeals court decisions, the only difference in decisions between female and male
judges was in employment discrimination cases); see generally Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The
Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596 (1985) (finding that
female judges “displayed a distinct pattern of deferring to positions taken by the government”).
45

See Boyd et al., supra note 44, at 389, 402, 406 (finding that the presence of a woman judge on a panel
with men increases the likelihood of the panel ruling in favor of the rights litigant); accord Farhang &
Wawro, supra note 44, at 324 (finding that “male judges vote more liberally when one woman serves on a
panel . . . as compared to all-male panels”); Peresie, supra note 44, at 1778 (finding that “[m]ale judges were
more likely to find for plaintiffs when at least one female judge was on the panel”).
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pattern.46 For instance, research suggests that Black judges are more favorable to
plaintiffs in affirmative action47 and voting rights cases,48 and even more favorable if the
plaintiffs in those kinds of cases are non-white.49 But in other civil contexts, the results
remain mixed.50
With regard to criminal sentencing, the results are also quite mixed. Some studies
find that Black judges are more lenient with Black defendants,51 some that Black judges

46

Maya Sen, Is Justice Really Blind? Race and Reversal in U.S. Courts, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S187, S190
(2015) (noting that on the question of “whether women and minority judges decide cases differently than
their white male counterparts . . . [for] the most part, the answer to this question has been yes, but they do so
in the context of substantively salient issues”); Allison P. Harris & Maya Sen, Bias and Judging, 22 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 241, 248–49 (2019).
47

Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI.
167, 179–81 (2013).
48

Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30 (2008).

49

See Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial
Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1141 (2008) (finding that Black judges are more likely to vote
in favor of plaintiffs in racial harassment cases); Cox & Miles, supra note 48, at 30 (finding that Black
appeals judges are more likely to vote in favor of non-white plaintiffs in Voting Rights Act cases); Jason L.
Morin, The Voting Behavior of Minority Judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Does the Race of the Claimant
Matter?, 42 AM. POL. RES. 34, 47–48 (2014) (finding that Black judges are more likely to favor Black
plaintiffs than white plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases); Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen,
Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 345
(2011) (finding that in employment civil rights disputes, “white judges were more likely to dismiss cases
involving minority plaintiffs while minority judges were less likely to dismiss cases involving white
plaintiffs”).
50

Jennifer A. Segal, Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton’s District Court
Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137, 147 (2000) (finding that “black and female district court appointees are no
more likely to serve the policy interests of their own communities than are [President Clinton’s] white and
male appointees”).
51

Susan Welch et al., Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 126, 132–33 (1988) (looking
at 3,418 cases of men convicted of a felony between 1968 and 1979 in an anonymous northeastern city and
finding that white trial judges treated Black defendants worse than white defendants while Black trial judges
treated Black and white defendants equally); Brian D. Johnson, The Multilevel Context of Criminal
Sentencing: Integrating Judge‐ and County‐Level Influences, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 259, 272 (2006).
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are harsher than white judges,52 and others find no differences at all.53 There are also
conflicting results on whether Black judges decide differently in death penalty cases.54
These mixed findings are also seen in studies that look exclusively at the federal
district courts. For example, one study using data collected by the United States
Sentencing Commission on offenders sentenced under federal sentencing guidelines
between 1992 and 2001 found that there were no significant disparities between
sentences imposed by Black judges and those imposed by white judges.55 However, in a
2019 study looking at that same federal data source for the years between 1999 and 2015
researchers found that Black judges issued shorter sentences than non-Black judges.56 Far
less research has been done on races and ethnicities other than Black and white,57
partially because there are comparatively fewer Hispanic, Asian and Pacific Islander, and
Native American judges serving in the judiciary.

52

Darrell Steffensmeier & Chester L. Britt, Judges’ Race and Judicial Decision Making: Do Black Judges
Sentence Differently?, 82 SOC. SCI. Q. 749, 755 (2001) (examining Pennsylvania sentencing data from 1991
to 1994 and finding that “black and white judges weighted case and offender information in similar ways
when making punishment decisions” with Black judges “more likely to sentence both black and white
offenders to prison”).
53

Cassia Spohn, The Sentencing Decisions of Black and White Judges: Expected and Unexpected
Similarities, 24 L. SOC’Y REV. 1197, 1201 (1990) (examining cases in Detroit where defendants were charged
with at least one of eleven felonies between 1976 and 1978 and finding no differences in sentencing between
white and Black judges—both groups of judges sentenced Black defendants more harshly).
54

Jonathan P. Kastellec, Race, Context, and Judging on the Courts of Appeals: Race-Based Panel Effects in
Death Penalty Cases 27 (Oct. 28, 2019) (working paper),
https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/jkastellec/files/kastellec_race_dp_paper_jsj_submission.pdf
[https://4HEP-AZAM] (examining federal and state death penalty appeals decisions between 1973 and 1995
and finding that “the addition of a single black judge to an otherwise all-nonblack panel significantly
increases the probability that a defendant gets relief from a death sentence”). But see Farhang & Wawro,
supra note 44, at 320 (finding that the presence of a Black judge does not impact judicial decisions).
55

Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of District-Level Judicial
Demographics, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 80–81 (2005).
56

Alma Cohen & Crystal S. Yang, Judicial Politics and Sentencing Decisions, 11 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y
160, 175 (2019).
57

But see Morin, supra note 49, at 47 (finding that Hispanic judges are less likely to rule in favor of
employment discrimination plaintiffs than non-Hispanic colleagues); Malcolm D. Holmes et al., Judges’
Ethnicity and Minority Sentencing: Evidence Concerning Hispanics, 74 SOC. SCI. Q. 496 (1993) (finding that
Hispanic judges are not as affected by defendant ethnicity as white judges).
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3. Age
Judicial age has not featured as prominently in the research literature. Indeed, one
review of the empirical literature suggested that “age is of minimal value in predicting
how judges will vote, particularly once other variables are considered.”58 The few studies
that have looked at the relationship between judicial age and criminal sentencing have
produced no clear pattern of results.59 The picture is no clearer in civil cases. One study
examined 540 bias rulings and 1,600 decisions in racial and gender discrimination cases
tried in the federal district courts between 1984 and 1995 and found that older judges are
more likely to favor older plaintiffs in age bias cases.60 But a later study using the same
data and analyzing it a different way found that there was no relationship between
judicial age and decisions in age discrimination cases.61
4. Ideology
A wide body of research in political science and empirical legal studies has examined
the role of judicial ideology in case outcomes, including sentencing. From the political
science perspective, judicial background matters, but it is political ideology that most
substantially affects judicial decision-making.62 A 2019 review of the political science
literature found that “differently situated judges might decide cases differently, but that
any differences associated with demographics are actually fairly issue-specific and much
less pronounced than differences rooted in ideology or partisanship.”63 While the facts of
the case and the law remain constraints, and while the relative impact of ideology on

58

Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 17 (2001).

59

Johnson, supra note 51, at 272 (finding that older judges are “less likely to incarcerate convicted offenders
and sentenc[e] them to shorter periods of confinement”).
60

See generally Kenneth L. Manning et al., Does Age Matter? Judicial Decision Making in Age
Discrimination Cases, 85 SOC. SCI. Q. 1 (2004).
61

Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Age (Really) Matter? A Response to Manning, Carroll, and Carp,
85 SOC. SCI. Q. 19, 19–20 (2004) (finding that Manning, Carroll, and Carp, in Manning, supra note 60, could
have reached a different conclusion based upon how they grouped their data).
62

Harris & Sen, supra note 46, at 248–49 (“[T]he literature suggests that differently situated judges might
decide cases differently, but that any differences associated with demographics are actually fairly issuespecific and much less pronounced than differences rooted in ideology or partisanship.”).
63

Id.
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outcomes remains debated, the literature is clear that the ideology of the individual judge
is a factor in judicial decision-making, including criminal sentencing.64
5. Interaction Effects
In addition to examining gender, age, race, and ideology individually, a handful of
studies have examined these variables in combination.65 These studies have often
produced nuanced findings. For instance, a study of Georgia judges found that older
judges were more likely to be punitive than younger judges, but not when offenders were
“disadvantaged.”66 Similarly, a study of Pennsylvania state sentences imposed between
1999 and 2000 found that “minority judges are somewhat less punitive,” judicial gender
does not likely affect sentencing, older judges are “less likely to incarcerate convicted
offenders and sentenc[e] them to shorter periods of confinement,” a judge’s prior military
experience increased the likelihood of incarceration, and the “tenure of judge was only
marginally associated with increased sentence severity.” 67 A later study conducted by the
same researcher using the same data found that older, female, and minority judges are
“substantially less likely to sentence offenders to jail or prison terms.”68 But a study
looking at 440,000 Texas felony cases between 2004 and 2013 concluded that judicial
ethnicity, gender, and political orientation had little effect on sentencing.69

64

See generally Cohen & Yang, supra note 56 (finding large discrepancies in federal criminal sentences
imposed by Republican and Democratic district judges, with Republican judges being more likely to mete out
longer sentences).
65

Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, Gender, Race, and Partisanship on the Michigan Supreme Court, 63 ALB. L.
REV. 1205, 1222–25 (1999); Carol T. Kulik et al., Here Comes the Judge: The Influence of Judge Personal
Characteristics on Federal Sexual Harassment Case Outcomes, 27 L. HUM. BEHAV. 69, 75 (2003); SUSAN B.
HAIRE & LAURA P. MOYER, DIVERSITY MATTERS: JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
(2015).
66

See generally Martha A. Myers, Social Background and the Sentencing Behavior of Judges, 26
CRIMINOLOGY 649 (1988).
67

Johnson, supra note 51, at 283.

68

See generally Brian D. Johnson, Judges on Trial: A Reexamination of Judicial Race and Gender Effects
Across Modes of Conviction, 25 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 159 (2014) [hereinafter Johnson, Judges on Trial].
69

See generally Claire S.H. Lim et al., Do Judges’ Characteristics Matter? Ethnicity, Gender, and
Partisanship in Texas State Trial Courts, 18 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 302 (2016).
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D. Assessing the Literature
Taken together, the literature just reviewed makes clear that although we know much
more than we did two decades ago, the relationship between judicial background and
sentencing decisions remains unclear. And we know almost nothing about the interaction
of demographic variables.
The literature is also unsatisfying in how it resolves the apparent differences between
the punitiveness studies, which show some fairly strong patterns based on race, gender,
and age, and the studies of real judges, in which these influences seem largely to
disappear. One prominent explanation is that sitting judges have been intensely
socialized—not just by their experiences on the bench, but also by all the legal
experiences that led them to the bench.70 Those experiences, according to this
explanation, have powerfully taught judges to follow the law regardless of the proclivities
they may have had before their intensive training. And, of course, the rule of law itself is
grounded on the notion that we expect its operators to be neutral and fair, expectations
that undoubtedly go a long way toward eliminating any general punishment biases based
on judicial demographics.
Nevertheless, there continues to be a vigorous debate about whether, and why, some
demographic biases seen in ordinary subjects seem to disappear—and in some cases
reverse—in sitting judges. For example, in a 2014 paper, University of Maryland
criminologist Brian Johnson took a second, somewhat more sophisticated statistical look
at the 1991–1994 Pennsylvania state judges data, limiting himself to cases that went to
trial, and he found that the judge’s race and gender had a larger impact than previously
believed.71 As we do in this study, Johnson recognized that plea-bargained cases—which
represent the vast majority of criminal cases—can also include sentence bargaining,
which can reduce or even eliminate a judge’s discretion.
Johnson was also one of the few researchers to consider judicial age. Researchers’
more general failure to consider a judge’s age in analyzing sentencing patterns is
surprising.72 Unlike some other individual characteristics that can be difficult to assess—
including race and ethnicity, and perhaps increasingly even gender—age is readily
70

See, e.g., Johnson, Judges on Trial, supra note 68, at 160.

71

Id.

72

There has been a similar reluctance to consider the effects of the offender’s (as opposed to the judge’s) age
on sentencing.
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determined.73 Moreover, despite the recent trend of appointing younger and younger
judges, America’s judiciary is old and getting older. The average age of sitting federal
judges is sixty-nine years old, older than at any other time in the country’s history.74 State
judges are a little younger, averaging about sixty.75 Our nation’s judges are getting old,
and we know almost nothing about the effects their aging might have on their job
performance in general and their sentencing practices in particular.
II. A Novel Approach: Studying the Interaction of Age, Gender, and Crime
Seriousness in Real Criminal Cases
To address the gaps identified in the literature, we pursued a study that focused on
real world criminal sentencing in the state courts of Colorado and that allowed us to
examine the interrelated effects of harm levels and the sentencing judge’s gender and
age.76 Our unique access to the large number of criminal sentences and judge
demographics in our data base (almost 3,000 individual sentences) allowed us not only to
analyze the individual impacts of these three variables, but also their interactive effects.
Before we outline our methodology, we begin with an overview of the Colorado criminal
system, the source of our rich dataset.
A. The Colorado Criminal System
As in most states, there are three primary categories of crimes in Colorado: petty
offenses, misdemeanors, and felonies. Petty offenses include minor violations such as

73

Although, as discussed below, we did have difficulty determining the ages of some of the judges in our
dataset who had retired or died. See infra note 107.
74

Francis X. Shen, Aging Judges, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2020). Cf. Albert Yoon, Federal Judicial
Tenure, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Lee Epstein & Stefanie A. Lindquist eds.,
2017) (noting that, though the average judicial age is rising, “[t]he average age at commission has declined,
albeit modestly, from the Truman to Obama administration”).
75

The best available data on the age of state judges comes from law professors Stacey George and Albert
Yoon. George and Yoon lead a project called “The Gavel Gap,” in which they investigate whether the
demographics of state court judges reflect the demographics of citizens in that state. Although not the focus
of their analysis, they observed birth year data for 5,378 state judges (out of 10,295 in their total dataset).
Based on this birth year data, they calculate average state judge’s age to be 59.6, with a median age of 60
(max age 88).
76

As we discuss in Part IV, the dataset did not allow us to code for offender characteristics, nor for judicial
race.
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littering77 or thefts of less than $50.78 Misdemeanors include thefts of more than $50 but
less than $2,000,79 false reporting to authorities,80 and third-degree assault (knowingly or
recklessly causing bodily injury but not serious bodily injury).81 Felonies are the most
serious of crimes, and they run the gamut from simple theft of more than $2,000,82 to
securities fraud,83 to first- and second-degree assaults,84 and to homicide.85 The most
minor of petty offenses carry only fines with no jail; all misdemeanors and the most
serious petty offenses carry potential jail sentences; all felonies carry potential prison
sentences.86
The Colorado legislature has further divided almost all petty offenses, misdemeanors,
and felonies into classes, which determine the potential length of any jail or prison
sentence.87 The most serious class within any category is Class 1. There are two classes
of petty offenses, three classes of misdemeanors, and six classes of felonies. For example,
third-degree assault is a Class 1 misdemeanor, meaning it is the most serious kind of
misdemeanor. First-degree murder is a Class 1 felony, the most serious kind of felony.
77

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-511(4).

78

Id. § 18-4-401(2)(b).

79

Id. §§ 18-4-401(2)(c)–(e).

80

Id. § 18-8-111(2).

81

Id. §§ 18-3-204(1)(b), (2).

82

Id. §§ 18-4-401(2)(f)–(j).

83

Id. §§ 11-51-603(1)–(2).

84

Id. § 18-3-202(2) (first-degree assault); id. § 18-3-203(2) (second-degree assault).

85

Id. § 18-3-102(3) (first-degree murder); id. § 18-3-103(3) (second-degree murder); id. § 18-3-104(2)
(manslaughter); id. § 18-3-105 (negligent homicide).
86

One important and common categorical difference between felonies and non-felonies is that felonies are
punishable by incarceration in prison, while non-felonies are punishable by incarceration in jail. See id. § 181.3-501(1)(b). In Colorado, prisons (except private ones) are state-run and state-funded, while jails are
typically county-run and county-funded. Despite this sharp distinction between prison for felonies and jail for
misdemeanors, Colorado trial judges can add a short jail sentence (up to ninety days) as a condition of felony
probation. Id. §18-1.3-202(1)(a).
87

Id. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(III) (felonies); id. § 18-1.3-501(1)(a) (misdemeanors); id. § 18-1.3-503 (petty
offenses).
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Colorado is a so-called Model Penal Code sentencing state, as opposed to a
sentencing-guideline state. This means that the presumptive ranges of potential jail or
prison sentences are set by the legislature, typically by class of crime, and that Colorado
judges generally have discretion to impose a specific point sentence (in days, months, or
years) within those presumptive ranges. Likewise, Colorado trial judges generally have
discretion whether to impose incarceration or non-custodial sentences such as fines,
probation, or, for felonies only, halfway-house sentences.88 There are some special
circumstances related to the crime or the criminal that can eliminate some or all of this
discretion, and which can make incarceration mandatory and even a certain amount of
incarceration mandatory.89
The only exceptions to the rule that when Colorado judges impose custodial
sentences they must impose a point sentence within the legislature’s established ranges
are certain kinds of sex offense felonies, in which any prison sentence must be
indeterminate.90 In those cases, if the judge imposes prison, they must impose a minimum
within the statutory range. However, the sentence itself is indeterminate, meaning it is
entirely up to the parole board to decide if the defendant will ever be released, and thus it
is potentially a life sentence.91
Finally, there are two kinds of Colorado state trial judges—county judges and district
judges—both of which were included in our dataset. County judges sit in every one of
Colorado’s sixty-four counties92 and have statutorily limited civil and criminal
jurisdiction. On the criminal side, they hear only petty offense and misdemeanor cases.93

88

See infra text accompanying notes 103–05 (discussing that halfway-house sentences present unique
challenges in terms of how to count such a sentence).
89

For example, certain crimes are designated “crimes of violence,” which must be punished with prison in a
range higher than the presumptive range. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(11). See infra text accompanying
note 117 (discussing whether these mandatory sentences infect the reliability of our findings).
90

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1004.

91

See infra note 105 (discussing how these kinds of indeterminate sentences also presented unique challenges
in terms of how to count them).
92

COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (creating county courts); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-101 (establishing them in
every county).
93

COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-106(1)(a).
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District courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and district judges sit in every one of
Colorado’s twenty-two judicial districts.94 On the criminal side, they hear only felonies.95
B. Methodology
Our dataset initially included all criminal sentences imposed by Colorado state judges
in the sixteen-year period from January 1, 2001, through December 31, 2016.96 Because
our study is aimed at the sentencing discretion different judges employ, and because
many Colorado state judges regularly engage in sentence bargaining—where the sentence
itself is also the product of the parties’ plea bargaining and thus the judge’s sentencing
discretion is limited or even eliminated—we excluded all plea-bargained cases, and with
the use of a filter we downloaded only cases that resulted in guilty verdicts after trial.97
For similar reasons, we also excluded cases in which the judge did not have meaningful
sentencing discretion, such as first-degree murder convictions for which the mandatory
sentence is life without parole. We excluded all convictions for drug possession, escapes,
and attempts of all kinds, because of the difficulty, and controversy, of assessing the
“harm” these kinds of crimes cause.
After applying all of these filters, we were left with 2,955 separate sentences
representing 183 different crimes imposed by 285 different judges, 180 male and 105
female.

94

COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 9 (creating district courts); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5-101 (establishing them in
judicial districts).
95

District courts actually have concurrent jurisdiction with the county courts to hear misdemeanors and petty
offenses. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-106(1)(a). But because the county courts have no jurisdiction over
felonies, as a practical matter most district courts have become felony-only criminal courts. District judges in
our dataset may nevertheless have imposed misdemeanor (or even petty offense) sentences if their defendant
was charged with a felony and a misdemeanor (or petty offense) and found guilty of the misdemeanor (or
petty offense), or if the jury returned a verdict of guilt on an uncharged misdemeanor (or petty offense) on
which it was instructed as a lesser offense.
96

The sentencing data was derived from the official electronic Colorado state records of these proceedings.
Although Colorado state criminal courts did not move entirely from paper files to electronic ones until
January 2017, they had always recorded certain information electronically, including the sentence date, the
crime of conviction, the sentencing judge’s name, and the length of the sentence. It was this electronic
information we downloaded to populate our dataset.
97

See supra text accompanying notes 71–72 (discussing that criminologist Brian Johnson also made the
decision to exclude plea-bargained cases when he re-examined the 1990s Pennsylvania sentencing data in his
2014 paper, for the same reason).
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For each of these 2,955 sentences we recorded the date of the sentence, the crime for
which the defendant was being sentenced,98 the statutory classification for that crime
(petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony, and the class of crime within those categories),99
the level of harm for that crime (low, medium, or high), the judge’s gender, the judge’s
age at the time of the sentence, the judge’s length of time on the bench at the time of the
sentence, and the length of the sentence.100 We recorded no other demographic
information about the sentencing judge101 and only limited demographic information
about the defendant being sentenced.102 What follows are summaries of how we
measured the length of sentence, the harm, and the judge’s age, as well as a discussion of
the problem that some of our judges imposed substantially more sentences over this time
period than others.

98

What we recorded was the actual statutory citation to the crime for which the defendant had been
convicted.
99

See supra text accompanying notes 77–86 (discussing these classifications under Colorado law).

100

See infra text accompanying notes 102–06 (discussing the conventions we used to count the length of the
custodial sentences).
101

There was simply no such information recorded in the official electronic files we used to populate our data
base, and we decided not to make guesses, or to search other extrinsic sources, for judge demographics. See
infra text accompanying notes 112–15 (discussing this limitation).
102

The official electronic files we used to download our data had spotty and sometimes ambiguous
information about the defendant’s race or ethnicity. There is a place in the formatting of those records to
record the defendant’s “race,” but our understanding is that that record is made by data-entry personnel in the
clerk’s office who base it on their review of the complaint, the affidavit in support of the arrest warrant,
and/or the probable cause statement. These documents sometimes refer to a defendant’s race or ethnicity, but
much more often they do not. As a result, the “race” entries in a large percentage of these electronic files are
blank. Even when they have been populated, they reflect the usual tension between race and ethnicity. For
example, and especially in the early years, it appears that almost all Hispanic defendants were labeled as
Caucasian, with no recording of their ethnicity. Of course, the boundaries between race and ethnicity are
complex and controversial, as census officials who have been struggling with this issue for many years have
come to realize. See, e.g., Jens Manuel Krogstad & D’Vera Cohen, U.S. Census Looking at Big Changes in
How It Asks About Race and Ethnicity, PEW RES. CTR. FACTTANK (Mar. 14, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/03/14/u-s-census-looking-at-big-changes-in-how-it-asks-aboutrace-and-ethnicity/ [https://perma.cc/N55S-WRU7]. In any event, because of this incomplete information
about defendants’ race or ethnicity, we did not consider those demographics in our analysis. See infra text
accompanying notes 112–15 (discussing this limitation).
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1. Length of Sentence
We looked at initial sentences only, not re-sentencings after probation revocations,
halfway-house revocations, reconsiderations of the sentences, or remands from appeal.
We quantified each sentence by the length of custodial time the judge imposed in the
initial sentence. Thus, if a defendant received probation coupled with a jail sentence, we
counted that as the length of the jail sentence. We did not consider any pre-sentence
confinement credit, nor any good-time or earned-time credits that jail or prison officials
might award. We did not consider that some felony defendants would be released early
on parole. We counted jail time the same as prison time and did not consider any
mandatory parole period a defendant sentenced to prison was required to serve once
released. We made all these definitional choices in an effort to focus on the one
phenomenon we were trying to measure: the sentencing discretion of individual trial
judges. For example, although the amount of presentence time a defendant must be
credited is certainly an important matter for the defendant, that time is a simple reflection
of the defendant being unable to post bond pending trial and not a reflection of the
judge’s sentencing discretion. Similarly, parole is mandatory in Colorado and its length is
determined by the level of the felony of which the defendant is convicted; the trial judge
has no discretion in this regard.
As has been done in other studies,103 we counted all halfway-house sentences as 120
days, roughly reflecting the “custodial” time most of those sentences represent.104 We
counted indeterminate sentences as the minimum of the indeterminate range that was
imposed plus ten years.105
103

Morris B. Hoffman et al., An Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-Selection by the
Marginally Indigent?, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 223, 235, 235 n.55 (2005).
104

Typical halfway-house defendants serve around four months in what is known as the “residential” phase
of the program, regardless of how many years the halfway sentence is. They are, in effect, under house arrest
and may not leave the facility. This residential status eventually transitions into work release and then into
non-residential status, where the defendant lives off-site and is at that point, for all functional purposes,
simply on probation for the balance of the halfway-house sentence.
105

In the prior study, see Hoffman et al., supra note 103, we counted indeterminate sentences differently than
we do here. At the time of that earlier study, indeterminately sentenced sex offenders were simply not being
released at all on parole. See, e.g., Phillip Cherner, Felony Sex Offender Sentencing, 33 COLO. LAW. 11, 18
(2004) (explaining that as of 2004, eight years after indeterminate sentencing began, not a single inmate had
been paroled from an indeterminate sentence). We therefore counted indeterminate sentences as 25% of the
difference between 110 years (which is how we arbitrarily quantified a life sentence) and the minimum of the
indeterminate range. Hoffman et al., supra note 103, at 235, 235 n.56. But since that study, parole officials
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Finally, we counted each sentence separately, even if they were imposed in the same
case and run concurrent to one another.106
2. Harm Ratings
For our harm ratings, and following the conventions used in many third-party
punishment studies, we divided all the sentenced crimes into one of three levels of
harm—low, medium, or high—based on the severity of the offense. We did that by
dividing the crimes into categories, not by looking at the individual facts in all 2,955
sentences. We used the statutory classifications of the crimes to put them into these three
harm categories:
Type/Class

Harm Level

Class 1, 2, or 3 felonies.......................................................................High
Class 4, 5, or 6 felonies..................................................................Medium
All petty offenses and misdemeanors..................................................Low
3.

Age

Our 285 different judges’ average age was 54.63 years.107 We decided to use just two
age splits divided by that median, because creating smaller age groups would have
significantly reduced our statistical power.108 Thus, our “older” judges were those who
have been releasing these defendants much more frequently than before. COLO. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS ET
AL., LIFETIME SUPERVISION OF SEX OFFENDERS: ANNUAL REPORT (2018),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B21TrpBx507cVnVYRHVuWlJKRk5BQzM1amxXS0kyNkFNaVBV/view
[https://perma.cc/YF9A-FP5W]. This change in how we counted those sentences was designed roughly to
reflect this newer parole reality.
106

This is also a different convention than we used in the prior study, where we assumed concurrent
sentences. Hoffman et al., supra note 103, at 234, 234 n.52. But in that study we were interested in the
sentences from the defendants’ points of view—how much actual time will they have to serve. Although that
question is, of course, also pertinent to measuring the judge’s exercise of discretion in sentencing, we simply
could not pull every one of our 3,000 sentences and manually determine which ones were concurrent and
which consecutive.
107

This is lower than the national average of about sixty. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. There
were a handful of judges whose ages or dates of appointment we were unable to determine. We excluded
their sentences.
108

See infra text accompanying notes 113–16 (discussing this statistical power problem).
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were 54.6 and older at the time of the sentence. Our “younger” judges were those who
were younger than 54.6 at the time of the sentence.
Our female judges were on average a little younger (mean ± standard deviation:
51.82 ± 7.99 years) than our male judges (55.72 ± 6.08 years). We decided to use the
54.63 average age without distinguishing between gender, both because that approach
gave us more statistical power than using two different age averages and because we
intended in any event to examine the interaction of age and gender.
We also looked at judges’ length of service on the bench, in contrast to just their
chronological age. We anticipated, as some of the punitiveness literature suggests and as
we have discussed,109 that any sort of age or gender bias might be culturally wrung out of
judges over time as they get comfortable with their roles and gain experience. We
therefore anticipated that a judge’s time on the bench would be a more important factor
than his or her chronological age. We were surprised to discover that length of service
was not correlated to any of our sentence outcomes. We therefore used length of service
only as a covariate.
4. Collapsing Multiple Sentences by the Same Judge
There was a wide variation in the number of trials conducted, and therefore the
number of sentences imposed, by any given judge among our 285 different judges,
ranging from a single sentence over this 16-year period to 74 sentences imposed by a
single county judge. A judge’s appointment date and duration on the bench may largely
account for this difference. But even within a single year there was wide variation in the
number of sentences imposed by individual judges. Some judges, mostly in busy urban
courts, tried many more cases in a given year than other judges. In addition, there was a
wide annual variation even within busy urban courts, probably because the judges in
some of those courts sit in different subject-matter divisions and rotate among those
divisions. Judges in Denver, for example, might not try a single criminal case for several
years during their assignment to non-criminal divisions (divorce and civil).
Because we were concerned that the wide variations in the number of sentences
imposed by a given judge might skew our data, we collapsed and averaged all multiple
sentences imposed by the same judge in the same calendar year within the same harm
level. We then kept track of, and controlled for, these multiple sentences by using the
sentence multipliers as a covariate.
109

See supra text accompanying notes 69–73.
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This left us with 1,215 separately-counted sentences, 921 of which were imposed by
male judges and 294 by female judges; 608 of which were imposed by older judges, 607
by younger judges; 581 of which were low harms, 331 medium, and 303 high.110 See
Table 1.
Table 1. Description of Judges Included in Data Set, by Harm Level, Age, and
Gender
Harm Level

Gender
Female

Low
Male
Female
Medium
Male
Female
High
Male

Age

Number of Judges

Younger (< 54.6 years)

111

Older (³ 54.6 years)

41

Younger

197

Older

232

Younger

52

Older

27

Younger

105

Older

147

Younger

38

Older

25

Younger

105

Older

135

III. Analysis and Results
We analyzed these 1,215 individual sentences using sentence length as the dependent
variable; the offense harm level, the judge’s age, and the judge’s gender as the
independent variables of interest; and the sentence multipliers and judge’s length of
service as additional covariates. In this Part, we discuss the results of that analysis and a
series of cautions in interpreting the data.
A. Results
If we ignore age entirely, male judges sentenced their defendants roughly the same as
their female colleagues. If we ignore gender entirely, older judges sentenced their
110

Because male judges tended to have more longevity, this manipulation also marginally improved our
male-female imbalance. See infra text accompanying notes 114–17 (discussing that imbalance).
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defendants roughly the same as their younger colleagues. By “roughly the same” we
mean there was no statistically significant difference between the two sets of sentence
distributions.111 Similarly, when we look at all cases without distinguishing harm levels,
there was no significant interaction between age and gender. That is, averaged across all
types of harm levels, younger female judges do not sentence differently than anyone else.
But when we also considered harm level, we found a significant three-way
interaction between harm level, judicial age, and judicial gender, which is reflected in
Figures 1 and 2. Younger female judges sentenced defendants in high harm cases to
sentences that averaged approximately 24% (4.9 years) longer than sentences imposed by
their male colleagues (p<0.05) and approximately 25% (5.1 years) longer than those
imposed by their older female colleagues (p<0.05). Figure 1 shows the average
sentencing amounts for all the possible combinations of our age, gender, and harm
variables.

111

“Significance,” as measured by p-values, is a statistical measure of the likelihood that a correlation is the
product of chance. P-values less than .05 are sometimes colloquially described as representing a “significant”
correlation; p-values less than .001 as a “highly significant” correlation. As set forth in the paragraph in the
text immediately below this signal, our three-way interactions had p-values of less than .05, meaning they are
statistically “significant.”
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Figure 1. Average Punishment Results Separated by Age, Gender, and Harm

Sentence Amount (years)
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In the low and medium harm cases, all the judges impose statistically indistinguishable
sentences, regardless of age or gender. But in the high harm cases, one group stands out:
younger female judges.
This result is depicted more starkly in Figure 2, which compares men and women
judges, with the younger judges on the left graph and the older ones on the right.
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Figure 2. Comparison of Criminal Sentencing by Female and Male Judges, by
Crime Seriousness
Comparing Female and Male Judges
for the Younger Population (<54.6 years old)
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This Figure compares average criminal sentences, measured in years on the y-axis, by low, medium, and high
crime harm levels indicated on the x-axis. The primary result to note is on the left-hand side of the Figure,
where the data show a statistically significant (p<0.05) difference between average sentences by younger
female as compared to younger male judges. Younger female judges sentence their defendants, on average, to
4.9 (~24%) more years than their younger male counterparts for high-harm crimes. For older judges, there are
no significant differences in sentencing.

B. Cautions in Interpreting the Results
Before we discuss the possible explanations and implications of these results in Part
IV, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of our study and raise cautions about
interpreting its results.
Perhaps most importantly, we were not able to code for a host of additional variables
likely to affect sentencing outcomes. Unobserved variables in this data include race or
ethnicity of the judge, ideology and partisanship of the judge, race or ethnicity of the
offender, the defendant’s criminal history, and the specific nature of the crime—although,
of course, the nature of the crime is partially captured by our harm assessments. Because
we did not have access to these additional variables, which the literature identifies as
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likely affecting criminal sentences,112 we need to recognize that our results here do not
paint a complete picture of the factors that drive judicial sentencing.113
That said, our primary finding would be most threatened if we had reason to believe
that offenders with certain criminal histories and case facts were systematically being
assigned to or away from younger female judges. We do not believe this to be the case,
and indeed in all multi-judge districts in Colorado, cases are generally assigned
randomly.
A second limitation comes from the requirements of statistical power. Because we
were attempting to measure the interaction of three different independent variables—two
with two conditions (gender and age) and one with three conditions (harm levels)—and
their effects on the dependent variable of sentence length, the statistical power was not
great enough to further investigate other possible interactions. The story of sentencing is
likely to be more nuanced; for instance, it could be that the effects we observed are
driven by very young (or very old) judges. Power considerations prevented us from
slicing our age cohorts any more finely than above and below the mean of 54.6 years old.
Likewise, it is entirely conceivable that only a certain kind of case—for example, sex
assaults or crimes against children—are driving the three-way interaction we discovered,
a fact that would be very important as we speculate about what the interaction means.
Again, power considerations prevented us from delving in any more detail into the nature
of the crimes beyond sorting them into high, medium, and low harm levels.114
Further, we not only had an unequal number of judges by gender (180 men to 105
women), but on average our male judges were older than our female judges. Our male
judges also imposed more sentences per judge than our female judges (a total of 921
112

See, e.g., Rodney L. Engen et al., Modeling the Effects of Legally Relevant and Extralegal Factors Under
Sentencing Guidelines: The Rules Have Changed, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 1207, 1217–18 (2000).
113

For instance, a study examined “the effects of emotional shocks associated with unexpected outcomes of
football games played by a prominent college team in the state” on judge sentencing and found that a loss by
the local college football team produced harsher juvenile sentences. See generally Ozkan Eren & Naci
Mocan, Emotional Judges and Unlucky Juveniles, 10 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 171 (2018); Adam N.
Glynn & Maya Sen, Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for
Women’s Issues?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 37 (2015) (finding that judges with daughters “consistently vote in a
more feminist fashion on gender issues” than judges with just sons and that these trends are stronger with
Republican judges).
114

In the hope that we might be able to delve further into the types of crimes, we coded every one of our 183
crimes for 6 characteristics: violent/non-violent; child/adult victim; sex/non-sex crime; death/non-death of
victim; DUI; other driving offense.
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sentences for the male judges and 294 for the females), further exaggerating this gender
disproportion. Although we are confident the age/gender/harm interaction we discovered
was statistically significant, we would be more confident in our results if the gender and
age splits were closer. We attempted to take a smaller sample of male judges to equalize
that split, but, once again, power limitations prevented us from meaningfully doing so.
It is possible that some or all of the harm piece in our three-way interaction is a
statistical artifact springing from the fact that high-harm cases tend to have the widest and
of course highest ranges for possible incarceration. The three-way interaction we
observed could be just a two-way interaction between age and gender, which expresses
itself only in high-harm cases simply because there is more room for it to be expressed in
those cases. Of course, far from being a limitation, this observation would broaden the
study’s potential impacts.
By design, we examined only criminal sentences imposed after a trial, in order to
maximize our judges’ sentencing discretion. But by doing so, we necessarily ignored the
ninety-plus percent of criminal cases that did not go to trial but were instead plea
bargained.115 This not only means our criminal sample was a tiny slice of all criminal
cases, it was a slice that has come under particular attention by scholars looking at what
they call the “trial penalty.” There are studies that suggest that judges sentence
defendants more harshly after a trial than they sentence similarly-situated defendants who
take a plea bargain.116 We are unaware of any literature suggesting this so-called trial
penalty might be affected by a judge’s age or gender, or by the seriousness of the offense,
though that is a possibility we cannot eliminate.

115

In 2010 (the latest date for which data was available from this source), 97.4% of all non-dismissed federal
criminal cases plea bargained. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIM. JUST. STAT. ONLINE, TABLE 5.22.2010: CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS DISPOSED OF IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS (2010),
https://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XM8-SSLE]. In 2006 (the latest
date for which data was available from this same source), an average of 94% of non-dismissed state criminal
cases plea bargained. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIM. JUST. STAT. ONLINE, TABLE 5.46.2006: PERCENT DISTRIBUTION
OF FELONY CONVICTIONS IN STATE COURTS (2006), https://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5462006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q3A5-VSJN].
116

See generally, e.g., Anthony Walsh, Standing Trial Versus Copping a Plea: Is There a Penalty?, 6 J.
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 226 (1990). But see generally Andrew Chongseh Kim, Underestimating the Trial
Penalty: An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Trial Penalty and Critique of the Abrams Study, 84 MISS. L.J.
1195 (2015) (no trial penalty); Shi Yan & Shawn D. Bushway, Plea Discounts or Trial Penalties? Making
Sense of the Trial-Plea Sentence Disparities, 35 JUST. Q. 1226 (2018).

160

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

40.1

Another challenge is that the judges imposing these sentences did not have unfettered
discretion—the sentences they chose had to be within the statutorily mandated ranges.117
These ranges necessarily distorted the sentencing data. A given judge imposing the
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years for an aggravated robbery might have imposed
much less had there not been a ten-year floor. A different judge imposing the maximum
of thirty-two years for an aggravated robbery might have imposed a longer sentence but
for the thirty-two-year ceiling. We have no way of knowing whether these distortive
effects were felt equally across age, gender, or even harm levels. Again, though, we have
no reason to believe these kinds of cases with mandatory sentences to incarceration were
distributed anything but randomly as among our judges.
IV. Discussion
Recognizing all the caveats in Part III.B, if our results can nevertheless be confirmed
by future studies, they could have significant theoretical, practical, and policy
implications.
Criminal sentencing is a core function of the judiciary, yet the individual judicial
background factors that drive those sentencing decisions remain poorly understood. Any
insights we can gain about this black box are important in their own right. Moreover, as
both a theoretical and methodological matter, our results suggest that future empirical
studies of judicial behavior recognize that as judges age, their decision-making may
change in ways that are relevant for criminal sentencing.
The age dynamic emerged in our data only when the sentencing judge was female
and the harms high. Why? Our data do not answer that tantalizing question, and we do
not intend by the discussion that follows to suggest that we have any concrete answers.
But because considering possible explanations will inform where future research might
need to be aimed, we offer a few speculative explanations before we turn to implications.
A. Possible Explanations
The three-way nature of the interaction suggests that no single explanation will be
sufficient. As already mentioned, the simple explanation that judges become less harsh as
they gain judicial experience does not explain these results, because it was only female
judges who became less harsh. And they didn’t become less harsh across the board, they
only became less harsh in high-harm cases. Moreover, our statistical analysis makes clear
117

See supra text accompanying notes 87–88.
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that it is the judge’s age, not judicial experience, that drives this interaction. Likewise,
any suggestion that some kind of broad generational difference might explain these
results must somehow account for the fact that women, but not men, seem to express that
generational difference, and only for high harms. Similarly, explanations that account for
gender differences alone will be inadequate. Theories that emphasize differences in male
and female judges’ sentencing patterns cannot explain why older female judges sentence
the same as male judges.
Finally, any explanation that properly considers both age and gender must explain
why this age/gender interaction is seen only for high harms. “For such-and-such reason
women, but not men, get harsher as they age” does not explain why our judges, men and
women alike, sentenced low and medium harms roughly the same. Neither would the
theory, supported by some occupational studies,118 that young women judges might be
trying to fit into a traditionally man’s world by acting more like men.
It is possible that our three-way interaction is more nuanced than our data allowed us
to investigate. For instance, data constraints required us to bifurcate judges into two
groups: older and younger. But the interaction may look different if age were examined
as a continuous variable. It is likewise possible that it is not driven by all high-harm
crimes, but only by a few kinds of crimes that particularly threaten the integrity of the
family—burglary, domestic violence, or sex assault on a child, for example. If these two
sets of sub-factors are actually driving our findings, then they may be part of a literature
showing women tend to be more punitive than men when it comes to certain kinds of
antisocial norm violations, namely men-on-women violence and crimes against
children.119 As far as we know, none of that literature examined whether this
phenomenon is more robust among younger women, but it is not implausible to think so.
Our single study cannot distinguish any of these speculative explanations, but it does
make clear the need for further empirical research in this area. Specifically, future
research should (1) explicitly consider the effect of judicial age and gender on sentencing
outcomes, perhaps by following individual judges longitudinally to see if their sentencing
practices change over time; (2) look at more refined age splits than the fifty-five year
median we were forced to use in our data; (3) examine the interaction of judicial age with
other judicial demographics, including race and ideology; (4) attempt to determine
118

See generally Abdelmagid M. Mazen & Jeanne Parr Lemkau, Personality Profiles of Women in
Traditional and Non-traditional Occupations, 37 J. OCCUPATIONAL BEHAV. 46 (1990).
119

Michelle K. Ryan et al., Who Cares? The Effect of Gender and Context on the Self and Moral Reasoning,
28 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 246, 250 (2004).
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whether this interaction is influenced by the judge’s own family structure and/or by
certain kinds of family-significant crimes; and (5) attempt to include defendants’
demographics as a factor influencing sentencing and interacting with the judges’
demographics.120
If, after these follow-ups, our results generally hold, then they could have practical
and perhaps even policy significance. Here, we sketch a few of those potential
implications.
B. Implications
No one with an even rudimentary awareness of human nature will be surprised to
learn that “judge shopping,” the process by which attorneys attempt to find the judge
most likely to be favorable to their client, is a standard part of litigation practice.121
Indeed, judge shopping has been institutionalized in a handful of states, which allow each
side in a case (criminal or civil) a one-time option to remove the assigned judge and have
a new one assigned to the case.122 Regardless of the folk psychology lawyers bring to
bear in making this decision—whether they think, for example, that former criminal
defense lawyers will be more lenient or less lenient than, say, former prosecutors—our
results suggest they also need to consider the judge’s age and gender.
Even in jurisdictions that do not allow lawyers to peremptorily challenge judges, our
results may have application in jury selection. In those handful of states that allow jurors
120

Future work should also examine whether the phenomenon we uncovered in a criminal sentencing context
has any application beyond the criminal law. For example, do trial judges (and jurors) exhibit a similar threeway interaction when deciding quasi-criminal issues, such as whether to award punitive damages?
121

Theresa Rusnak, Related Case Rules and Judge-Shopping: A Resolvable Problem?, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 913, 923 (2015) (“As long as different judges continue to hand down inconsistent sentences for
similar crimes, attorneys will have incentives to judge shop to obtain the most favorable outcomes for their
clients, whether that be through marking cases as related or refusing to disclose judicially-rejected plea
agreements.”).
122

ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.022 (2002); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 42(c) (2009); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 42.1; ARIZ. R. CRIM.
P. 10.2; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 235-36.5-1; MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-805
(2003); MO. R. CIV. P. 51.05; NEV. SUP. CT. R. 48.1; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-3-9; N.M. R. CIV. P. 1-088.1;
N.M. CRIM. P. 5-106; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.20 (1998) (applying to criminal cases only); WYO. R. CIV. P.
40.1(b) (2019). Some states permit peremptory challenges to judges designated by special appointment, such
as visiting judges, but do not extend the privilege to the trial courts generally. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 74.053 (2003). Peremptory challenge procedures have been proposed for federal judges but have
never been adopted. See, e.g., Peremptory Challenge Act of 2011, H.R. 3196, 112th Cong. (2011).
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to impose criminal sentences,123 prosecutors and defense lawyers in high-harm cases may
want to think about their prospective jurors’ ages and genders. Even in the vast majority
of jurisdictions where judges, not jurors, impose criminal sentences, our results may
nevertheless have some application in jury selection. Aspects of the three-way interaction
we saw in a sentencing context may spill over into jurors’ roles as factfinders. Perhaps
lawyers already sense that female jurors may have special feelings about crimes that
threaten families, feelings that might impact their verdicts; they may not realize that, if
our results hold up in such circumstances and extend beyond sentencing judges to jurors,
those feelings may tend not to be shared even by men with children, and may tend to
disappear in women as they get older.
Our results might even inform debates about judicial selection and mandatory
retirement. Those relatively young people appointed by recent administrations to the
federal trial bench, mentioned at the beginning of this Article,124 may sit for a long time,
but our study suggests that young male appointees will not be as tough on serious crime
as their young female colleagues, and that even the women will tend to age out of their
sentencing toughness.
Do our results require any kind of policy response? Not necessarily. On the one hand,
the interaction we discovered may be viewed simply as being a very small part of the
large and changing canvas on which a judge’s whole life plays out in the form of
sentencing attitudes and practices. Not every demographic influence on judges, even if
statistically significant, justifies policy changes. There is no doubt a host of other as yet
undiscovered effects that arguably do not need policy corrections. What if future
researchers discover, for example, that judges over six feet tall are harsher or easier
sentencers than their shorter colleagues? Such a result might be important to lawyers as
they contemplate which judges or jurors to peremptorily excuse, but we doubt anyone
would suggest that this single factor should have much to do with policies surrounding
judicial selection or retirement. Focusing on any particular interaction at the expense of
other more salient policy considerations seems short-sighted. Finally, of course, who is to
say that the younger female judges in our study were “wrong” for being harsher
sentencers, and their male and older female colleagues “right” for being more lenient, as
opposed to the other way around? Sentencing, by its very nature, is normative, and thus
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See supra text accompanying note 1.
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not generally susceptible to these kinds of comparative judgments.
On the other hand, the effects we saw were statistically significant and large. What
do we tell a criminal defendant who wants to know why his young female judge
sentenced him to a term five years longer than the term a similarly-situated defendant
received from a male or older female judge? What do we tell the victim if the judge in her
case was male or an older female and imposed a lenient sentence? Age and gender, unlike
height, are significant, character-affecting traits whose broad influences should not be
surprising to anyone, and which are therefore arguably game for policy considerations.
Finally, there are arguments to be made that the younger female judges in this study were
in fact “wrong” in their harsh sentences in the sense that they were the age and gender
outliers. Their male and older female colleagues sentenced less harshly than they did, and
significantly so. Moreover, it appears that, on average, those younger female judges will
themselves tend to return to the norm of less harsh sentences as they age.
In the end, we doubt that any policymakers will, or should, use these results to pivot
dramatically from any given policy trajectories. But our results probably will matter at
the margins of these policies and in case-specific applications, as nominating authorities
consider specific judicial candidates and perhaps even as legislatures consider proposed
legislation setting or resetting specific mandatory judicial retirement ages.
Judicial education may also be an appropriate response. Just calling this data to the
attention of trial judges could go a long way toward closing this age-gender sentencing
gap. Young female judges apprised of this trend, especially if further research shows it is
driven by a few kinds of crimes, may become less harsh with those crimes just knowing
that they are outliers compared to their male and older female colleagues.
Conversely, presenting these results as part of judicial education may well cause
older female judges to reassess their sentencing patterns for a few kinds of high-harm
crimes and perhaps even recapture the sense of appropriate harshness they once had when
they were younger judges. It might even cause male judges to reassess their relative
leniency.
CONCLUSION
Our examination of a database of tried criminal cases in Colorado shows a three-way
interaction not previously reported in the literature: Younger female judges sentence
high-harm cases significantly more harshly than their male and older female colleagues.
More work needs to be done to confirm these results and to ferret out details in finer age
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cuts and subsets of high-harm crimes. But if they hold, researchers, practicing lawyers,
judicial educators, and perhaps even appointing authorities and legislatures should take
note.

